Middle Knowledge and Biblical Interpretation by Chiew Sze Sze

Author:Chiew, Sze Sze
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Peter Lang AG
Published: 2016-06-11T00:00:00+00:00

4.4.1 Objections of Theoretical Issues

As to theory, there are two main objections:46 (1) there neither are nor can be true counterfactuals of freedom (all are either false, or true or false) because they fail to be grounded in reality (the “grounding” objection); (2) there neither are nor can be true counterfactuals of freedom prior to God’s decision, because their truth value depends on the actual created world.47 Apparently, both of these objections seriously challenge the truth value of the counterfactual propositions that are central to Molinism. Hence, much has been written about the “grounding” objection and its contention has been modified and transformed into different versions over the years. Generally, it is argued that there neither are nor can be contingently true counterfactuals of freedom because there is nothing in reality that “grounds” their truth or makes them true. Counterfactuals of freedom or counterfactual statements about what a person would freely have done under ← 119 | 120 → different circumstances cannot be true, because they are just statements about events or actions that will never exist, or they are statements about creatures that will never exist. Since they are conditionals of only what would exist if the situation were different, they do not correspond to reality and hence cannot be true. Who or what grounds their truth becomes an unanswerable question as well.48

On the other hand, it is also pointed out that the premises on which Molinism stands, taken together with other principles, establish a more complicated anti-Molinist argument. Since in Molinism, we freely do something only if we are able to do otherwise in the same circumstance, we in fact have no counterfactual power over any true antecedents and their consequents, so none of our actions is or would be free.49 If this is the case, there are no true counterfactuals of freedom. In other words, in Molinism, we do not “bring about” the truth of any counterfactuals of freedom about us. This argument is initiated by Hasker and is commonly known as the “bring about” argument. Moreover, if we assume that counterfactuals do have truth value, their existence turns out to be incompatible with libertarian freedom as well. This is because if any counterfactuals of freedom were true, they would be part of, or entailed in, the “fixed” history of the world prior to our choices and actions (since they have already had causal consequence), so we would have no ← 120 | 121 → control of any sort over them.50 If this is the case, we would not be the ultimate source of any of our choices and actions, and so we would not be free. While Molinists claim to be the champion of libertarian freedom, they are committed to principles that are inconsistent with it, so the objection goes.

Craig gives three reasons for holding that counterfactual statements can be true. First, “very little reflection is required to reveal how pervasive and indispensable a role such counterfactuals play in rational conduct and planning,”51 since “we use

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